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ABSTRACT 
THEEFFECTIVE USE, BY STUDENTS AND OTHER USERS, of online and Inter- 
net resources depends crucially upon a clear understanding of the form 
and content of complex electronic networks. Because these networks, and 
related electronic systems, are often initially unfamiliar even to sophisti- 
cated users, it is important that adequate models and analogies be avail- 
able to support learning and teaching of, and with, these resources. This 
article discusses some of the obstacles to effective learning inherent in 
the nature of these systems, and in the ad hoc conceptual tools that many 
users bring to their understanding of these systems. Particular attention is 
given to the nature of metaphorical explanation and comprehension in 
other disciplines, and the ways in which these patterns of understanding 
can be applied to our interaction with the Internet. Finally, a modest sug- 
gestion concerning one kind of metaphor for the Internet is proposed 
and described for use in classroom instruction. 
THECOGNITIVEPROBLEM 
What do our students know about the Internet, and when do they 
know it?For nearly a decade, thoughtful observers of this scene have been 
arguing that critical thinking is the key to successful interaction with online 
information resources (initially, online catalogs, but more recently the 
World Wide Web). This should not be news. The problem is that many 
students at all levels are ill-equipped to deal with abstract concepts of any 
kind. The concepts of evidence, of authority, of reasoned thought and 
narrative-and of how these are exemplified in the resources of a library 
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and can be intellectually exploited-are all quite foreign to a very sub- 
stantial number of undergraduates. In fact, higher-order conceptual skills 
of any kind are uncommon for many of our students (McFadden & 
Hostetler, 1995, p. 224). Oberman (1991) correctly notes that most on- 
line information retrieval instruction requires students to operate in the 
realm of the abstract-of metaphor and conceptual models. “In every in- 
stance,” she laments, “students must engage in what is most likely unfa- 
miliar cognitive territory” (p. 196). In a recent book on the Internet, Paul 
Gilster (1997) finds it necessary to make this point repeatedly: “[The] 
tools are intellectual and attainable, for digital literacy is about mastering 
ideas, not keystrokes” (p. 15). 
What is worse, most students have no idea that they are in trouble. 
This is a pipeline problem. At the secondary-school level, where the appli- 
cation of technology to instruction is often a vital school reform compo- 
nent, the focus still seems to be on information tools-that is, hardware-
instead of on the cognitive processes needed to evaluate and use the in- 
formation (Tyner, 1998, p. 86). This seduction of the innocent by the 
glamour of computers and the Internet results in a strong tendency among 
students to concentrate on the merely technical aspects of successful WWW 
use and on the details of various search protocols rather than on develop- 
ing thoughtful methods for understanding the nature of their interaction 
with the network. Oberman (1991) found, to her dismay, that “numerous 
studies . . . suggest that some students view the online environment as a 
means of circumventing traditional mechanisms for understanding the 
relationships between their information needs and information resources” 
(p. 196). In other words, they would rather do than think about what they 
are doing. The online environment itself creates the most significant oh- 
stacle to comprehension (Martorana & Doyle, 1996, p. 184).’ 
But students certainly seem to feel good about their WWW skills. Sur- 
veys have indicated repeatedly that most students are very confident about 
their Internet abilities. In fact, they are nearly as confident about their 
Internet talents as they are about their knowledge of a vastly less complex 
online activity, electronic mail (Rumbaugh, 1999, p. 32; Hirt et al., 1999, 
pp. 22-23). Teachers routinely see this attitude at work in the bored ex- 
pressions of students in bibliographic instruction classes on the Internet 
and online information resources. This naive ignorance is consistent with 
the mode of learning favored by students as the most common way in 
which they acquire their largely mythical Internet skills-self-teaching. 
Again, surveys have indicated that students, especially with respect to 
Internet use, prefer self-guided and independent methods of learning. 
Self-taught students also have greater self-esteem with respect to their 
Internet skills (Duggan et al., 1999, p. 13). It is revealing that many stu- 
dents and researchers refer to this method of learning as “trial and error” 
(Davis, 1999, pp. 70-71).2 
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For most students, indeed for most Internet searchers, the Internet is 
a typical black box. Very complicated things happen inside of it, but noth- 
ing about the box itself reveals what is going on. Our only “window” into 
the box, the computer monitor screen, is strictly one-dimensional; the 
scrolling metaphor is singularly apposite here. Unlike a card catalog, which 
at least provides some physical indication of how large the associated da- 
tabase is-and even sometimes of how it is arranged and therefore ac- 
cessed-the WWW exhibits no such obvious clues. Sometimes it appears 
to be incomprehensibly vast, and at other times apparently contains noth- 
ing at all; little about the black box suggests an explanation for this seem- 
ingly random disparity of results. Even an ordinary book provides more 
indicators of content and arrangement than the Internet. A book has a 
front and back, and thus a beginning and ending; it moves, in general, 
sequentially through a narrative; some things come before and, there- 
fore, introduce other things; some things come after and, therefore, con- 
clude other things. The words and sentences have a context that is physi- 
cally evident, as well as conceptually manifest; in some books there is a lot 
of information, and in others not very much.3 But the WWW essentially 
decontexualizes the ideas that emerge from it upon request (Birkerts, 
1994, pp. 122, 123, 129; Van Hartesveldt, 1998, pp. 51-59).4There is no 
history here, no development of ideas, no context for thinking about why 
some things are said and other things remain unspoken. For the user of 
the network, history began about a decade ago, something that is reflected 
in how disturbingly ahistorical many of our students are. 
This is the crux. The Internet is roughly akin to a closed system 
without external manifestation, rather like a box filled with a substance 
about which we can only guess the essential properties based on the 
behavior of pointers and dials on measuring instruments. Students and 
other searchers of the Internet have cobbled together a whole array of 
analogies and images to explain how the Internet works. We will find 
that these metaphors are mostly inadequate or just downright wrong. 
What we need is a new understanding of the role metaphor plays in our 
attempts to comprehend and to teach about the Internet to students 
and to others who are often bereft of the conceptual tools required to 
grasp highly abstract concepts. Knowing how metaphors, analogies, and 
models contribute to the successful management of our conceptual lives 
may provide us with innovative approaches to both learning and teach- 
ing about networks. 
METAPHORSIN ORDINARY AND THINKINGLANGUAGE 
Compared to our actual experience of the world, the world in which 
we live and function is extraordinarily complex and abstract. We begin 
life, after all, with essentially no awareness that there is any ontological 
distinction among any of our sensations-everything is “real” and even 
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the separation between ourselves and everything else is arguably a learned 
concept. When we finally do begin to make the distinction between what 
happens to me and what happens in the “external” world, our picture of 
reality divides itself into two-and really only two-parts: there is all of 
that part of the world that is outside my mind (and perhaps also my body), 
and there is everything that belongs just to me and does not exist in a 
public space. We remain aggressively egocentric, but at least not every- 
thing exists only in my world; there are things that carry on whether we 
are aware of them or not, and eventually there are also other people who 
presumably have similar experiences. And, even until fairly late in this 
development, external things and events are often imbued with life and 
intention (animism). Thus the great bifurcation in nature that Descartes 
hardened into a strong and very plausible metaphysics. 
It remains true, nevertheless, that the conceptual toolkit we evolve 
for understanding the world and the events that happen to us is remark-
ably limited. Certainly our experience of things in space is, at least ini- 
tially, limited to what our unaided senses provide us. It is no naive em- 
piricism to suggest that the conceptual framework within which we move 
about the world is very much informed by our experience of macro-
scopic objects and events. No word, it has been remarked, is metaphysi- 
cal without its having first been physical (Hutten, 1954, p. 293). And 
precisely because we experience objects in space, many of our funda- 
mental concepts are also organized in terms of one or more spatialized 
metaphors: up/down, left/right, near/far, and so on. These metaphors 
are not randomly assigned (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a, p. 464; Garnham, 
1999, pp. 45-48).5 
It follows that our ordinary language and, to a large extent, our tech- 
nical language, must be inevitably metaphorical. Most of the metaphor 
embedded in our everyday expressions has been lost-if we ever knew the 
original meanings in the first place. But we seem to have a signal talent 
for inventing ways of talking about the unfamiliar in terms of resemblances 
between new experiences and familiar facts; what is novel is understood 
by subsuming it under established distinctions (Nagel, 1961, p. 108).6 What 
is even more important, the metaphors that we use are often not merely 
just a matter of alternative words but contribute importantly to the nature 
of the things about which we speak: the metaphor sometimes creates the 
similarity as much as it formulates some similarity antecedently existing 
(Black, 1962, p. 37). 
To illustrate this point, we often speak of a “friendly argument,” but 
the words we use to talk about arguments in general are anything but 
friendly. Clearly, the metaphor for an argument for most of us is that of 
war. We say that “he attacked every weak point,” or that “Idemolished his 
argument,” and even that “she shot down all my arguments.” We talk about 
“marshaling” the evidence for an argument as though, somehow, military 
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logistics were involved. In fact, the very earliest uses of this expression had 
to do merely with lining (usually people) up in some kind of order (as at 
a feast, for instance), but the military implication occurs in English by the 
late sixteenth century. Within a short time, however, the metaphoric use 
had come to mean simply arranging almost anything (material or imma- 
terial) in methodical order; the original use had been lost. It is signifi- 
cant, nonetheless, that the military sense has remained an implicit part of 
the language of argument-and that, whatever we might say otherwise, 
this is how we really view the concept.’ 
A metaphor is, therefore, a kind ofpretense. In using a metaphor, even 
when the original sense has long since disappeared or been completely 
assimilated, we are pretending that something is the case when it is not 
(Turbayne, 1970, p. 13). A good metaphor gives us a stance from which to 
view something outside the usual limits of our experience; it is most fun- 
damentally, as Kenneth Burke (1945) observed: 
a device for seeing something in terms of something else. It brings 
out the thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this. [We] could say 
that metaphor tells us something about one character as considered 
from the point of view of another character. And to consider A from 
the point of view of B is, of course, to use B as a perspective upon A. 
(pp. 503-04) 
METAPHORSAND MODELSIN SCIENCE 
It should not be surprising that we are strongly inclined to engage in 
metaphorical expression in talking and thinking about the complex inter- 
active and network systems that we confront in both using and learning 
from computers. Nor should it be surprising that we are more than some- 
times misled by the analogies that we use to understand human-computer 
interaction. Because these metaphors are often technical analogies for 
unfamiliar target systems, it will be useful to consider briefly the use of 
metaphor in scientific explanation. 
In the literature of the philosophy of science, as well as that of cogni- 
tive psychology, the expression “mental model” is common. An elaborate 
taxonomy of terms related to this concept has been developed to describe 
what happens in learning, thinking, and explaining through metaphor 
(e.g., Gentner & Stevens, 1983). For our purposes, the precise linguistic 
and conceptual relationships among the ideas of metaphor, analogy, mental 
model, and conceptual model are not really important. Even the techni- 
cians are frequently willing to consider a model to be very similar to a 
metaphor in ordinary language, although perhaps more detailed and for- 
mal (Hutten, 1954, pp. 84,289,293). Certainly a model need not be men- 
tal in any but the trivial sense that something is “mental” just by virtue of 
being thought about; we are all familiar with the Tinkertoy constructs 
chemistry students use to represent molecular structure. Whether we call 
92 LIBRARY TRENDS/SUMMER 2001 
it a metaphor, an analogy, a model, or simply an image, what is important 
here is the function of whatever it is that plays this role in our speaking, 
learning, and thinking.s 
There is substantial historical disagreement about the legitimate role 
of models in scientific reasoning, explanation, and predictiong But there 
can also be no doubt that historical models of various kinds have strongly 
influenced the development of sophisticated theoretical concepts. Whether, 
once elaborated and confirmed, a high-level theory still requires the origi- 
nal model for any conceptual, psychological, or explanatory function is at 
least debatable. We can learn some important lessons about the role of 
models in scientific reasoning from a brief consideration of two examples 
in the history of science: (1)the development of the concept of atmospheric 
pressure, and (2) the development of the kinetic theory of gases.”’ 
TheAtmosphere as a n  Ocean of Air  
The basic facts concerning what we now call “air pressure” have been 
known since before the time of Aristotle. We have all experienced trying 
to draw a liquid up through a tube and finding that, by doing so, we some- 
how seem to pull on the liquid. We know that we can hold the liquid in a 
tube after we have pulled it up, simply by closing off the top end. Anyone 
draining a liquid from a barrel, or similar container, is aware that the 
liquid will not run out unless there is an opening somewhere near the 
top. Why is this so? Is something actually pulling on the liquid, causing it 
to move upward? Or is it necessary to open up the top of the container to 
permit the air pushed out of place by the liquid to find another space to 
occupy? If the universe were a plenum of some kind, then these phenom- 
ena would make sense; no vacuum is possible if there is “stuff‘ everywhere 
all the time, just moving around to vacate and fill space as necessary. For 
centuries, this explanatory idea was known as the Aristotelian principle 
that “nature abhors a vacuum.”l’ 
This same idea could be, and was, applied to explain the action of a 
suction pump. The use of a simple piston pump to move water from lower 
to higher places, and in particular to pump water from deep mines, was 
widespread by the end of the sixteenth century. A crude but effective sys- 
tem of staged pumps in tandem, to raise water to substantial heights, was 
illustrated by Agricola in his famous 1556 treatise on mining (Conant, 
1951, p. 68). Until Galileo, however, no one seems to have called atten- 
tion to the odd fact that a single pump cannot raise water more than 
about thirty-two feet. Nature may abhor a vacuum, but why only to this 
seemingly arbitrary height? Galileo noticed this problem but missed en- 
tirely an opportunity to provide the correct explanation. On the first day 
of the conversations reported in his Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, 
Galileo remarked upon this difficulty concerning water raised by a pump; 
he seemed to regard this as simply a case of a long column of something 
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unable to support its own weight (‘just “as if it were a rope”) (Drake, 1974, 
p. 25). But this is the wrong analogy. It is not the weight of the column of 
water that is important, it is the weight of something else. It was left to 
Galileo’s student, Torricelli, to find the right model. 
It is important to notice that we do not experience the “weight” of 
air-certainly not in the same way we experience the weight of water. Vi- 
sualizing that air exerts pressure from all sides in the same way that water 
exerts pressure (varying with the depth) requires a leap of the imagina- 
tion and a selective transfer of properties that are not obviously connected. 
In a famous letter written three years before he died, Torricelli described 
us as living “immersed at the bottom of a sea of elemental air” and subject 
to the resulting atmospheric pressure (Magie, 1935, pp. 70-73). Almost 
certainly, Galileo also recognized that the atmosphere has weight but ap- 
parently did not believe that it exerts a surrounding pressure in the way 
that water does. 
Thinking of the atmosphere as analogous to an ocean, although made 
up of something much less heavy than water, provides an explanation for 
the limitations of a suction pump. If it is the weight of the air that pushes 
down on the water at the bottom of the pumping column, to lift it up as a 
vacuum is created at the top of the column, then the column of water will 
be raised only in proportion to the weight of the column of air available to 
sustain it. This picture lends itself to confirmation by an obvious experi- 
ment, the one Torricelli performed in 1643 or 1644 (Middleton, 1964, 
pp. 29-32) and for which he is now known in every class in elementary 
physics. If the column of water is sustained at about thirty-two feet by the 
weight (pressure) of the air, then a similar column of a heavier substance, 
such as mercury, should be supported in a column at a correspondingly 
lower level (in this case, at about 2.4 feet). The experiment, performed by 
Torricelli and his friend Viviani, was an almost perfect success. At one 
stroke, Torricelli had invented the mercury barometer, the use of mer- 
cury as an experimental tool in the study of gases, and a method for pro- 
ducing a vacuum (Conant, 194’7, p. 39). But this is only one important 
consequence of the hypothesis that the atmosphere is like an ocean. The 
philosopher and scientist Pascal was shortly to articulate, and test, another 
one. 
If the atmosphere is analogous to an ocean, Pascal reasoned, then a 
short column of air should exert less pressure than a tall one. The expla- 
nation does not require a vacuum because none is created in the process 
simply of moving higher in the atmosphere. The obvious test, then, would 
be to measure the “weight” of the air (atmospheric pressure) at varying 
distances from the surface of the earth by discovering whether the mer- 
cury in a barometer changes in height as a function of the relative eleva- 
tion at which the experiment is conducted. Here is Pascal’s own descrip- 
tion of the analogy and the inference: 
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Just as the bottom of a bucket containing water is pressed more heavily 
by the weight of the water when it is full than when it is half empty, 
and the more heavily the deeper water is, similarly the high places of 
the earth, such as the summits of mountains, are less heavily pressed 
than the lowlands are by the weight of the mass of the air. This is 
because there is more air above the lowlands than above the moun- 
tain tops; for all the air along a mountain side presses upon the low- 
lands but not upon the summit, being above the one but below the 
other. (Schwartz & Bishop, 1958,p. 353) 
In 1648, Pascal’s brother-in-law agreed to carry a mercury barometer 
to the top of the Puy-de-D6me in the central mountain range of France. 
An observer at the foot of the mountain kept constant watch on a similar 
barometer while various measurements were taken at the summit under 
diverse conditions. Pascal’s predictions were completely vindicated. After 
all, why should nature abhor a vacuum more at the surface of the earth 
but less on a mountain top? 
The final chapter of this particular tale was written by Newton’s con- 
temporary, Robert Boyle. Boyle had heard about Pascal’s experiments in 
the 1650s, even though the publication of Pascal’s treatise on pneumatics 
was delayed until 1663 (Conant, 1957, p. 9). He rightly understood that if 
Torricelli had offered the correct explanation of the behavior of liquids in 
the presence of the weight of the air, then this theory should be testable 
in an artificial vacuum. Significantly advancing the techniques of building 
air pumps for experimental purposes,’* Boyle constructed an air pump 
and receiver to contain a mercury barometer that would respond to air 
pressure inside the apparatus. Taking this idea to its logical conclusion, 
Boyle remarked, if “we could perfectly draw the air out of the receiver, it 
would conduce as well to our purpose, as if we were allowed to try the 
experiment beyond the atmosphere” (Conant, 1957, p. 19). Not surpris- 
ingly, Boyle found the result he had expected: as the quantity of air in the 
receiver was reduced by the suction pump, the level of the mercury in the 
barometer correspondingly fell. The Aristotelian horror vacui had been 
dealt a fatal blow.13 
Good Models 
Based on this (paradigmatic) example, can we articulate any general 
characteristics of “good” cognitive models? Whether a model is “good” or 
“bad” is very much a matter of what the model is for and for whom it is 
intended.14 Various attempts have been made to catalog the features of a 
good cognitive model (e.g., Mayer, 1989, pp. 59-60; Russon et al., 1994, p. 
178). But if we take the most important feature of any particular model to 
be its function, or value, in a given learning situation, then most of the 
suggested characteristics can be summarized in just two quite general con- 
cepts: explanatory power and predictive effectiveness. This conclusion 
follows directly from the reasonable assumption that the purpose of a 
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mental model “is to allow the person to understand and to anticipate the 
behavior of a physical system” (Norman, 1983, p. l2).I5 
We must be careful not to identify a legitimate explanation of an event 
or process only with an analysis in terms of what is already familiar to us.16 
For one thing, what counts as “familiar” to a given individual is very much 
dependent on time and circumstance. But, more importantly, the devel- 
opment of theoretical physics in the twentieth century has left most of us 
in the conceptual dust. It may be, as the physicist P. W. Bridgman (1936) 
argued, that we have lost something in the way of intellectual satisfaction 
with our theorizing when we can no longer supply an intuitively under- 
standable model of a process or event (pp. 62-63). We may be able to 
model the process mathematically, but we no longer real4 understand what 
is going on. Richard Feynman (1964) once remarked that, while he could 
very well picture invisible angels, he was quite unable to visualize electro- 
magnetic waves (p. 20:9). And certainly beginning with Sir Arthur 
Eddington’s notorious two tables, the theoretical content of natural sci- 
ence has become increasingly remote from everyday experience-and even 
from anything we can readily imagine (Nagel, 1961, pp. 45-46; Wolpert, 
1992, pp. 1-24).’’ 
So, an adequate understanding of an event or process, particularly in 
natural science, probably does not require a conceptual model of the sort 
I have described to be an essential part of the explanatory apparatus, but 
it helps. And this is arguably one of the characteristics of a good cognitive 
model when one is appropriate: in our interpretation of the target sys- 
tem, the elements, and their relationships, in the model should provide 
some kind of intellectual satisfaction. The metaphorical light bulb turns 
on. Now we get it; before, we did not. Even more importantly, the analogy 
provides us with an explanation for what we observe. If the atmosphere is 
like an ocean of air in the relevant respects, then we can explain why we 
observe, for instance, that water in ordinary circumstances can only be 
raised to about thirty-two feet by a suction pump. If a gas does consist of 
minute perfectly elastic particles, then we can explain why, under given 
conditions, the sides of a container experience the “pressure” that we 
actually observe. It may not even matter much whether the analogy is 
true, only that it consistently yield the correct experimental results. 
This brings us to the other important characteristic of a good cogni- 
tive model: predictive effectiveness. While a productive analogy interprets 
what we already know, it must also permit an extension into the realm of 
what we do not know. A good cognitive model helps organize our experi- 
ence as we have it, but it also yields implications that are subject to experi- 
mental confirmation (or falsification). This is the heuristic function of a 
good metaphor (Borgman, 1986, p. 48; Hutten, 1956, p. 84; Norman, 1983, 
p. 12; Rickheit & Sichelschmidt, 1999, pp. 19-20). Pascal drew upon this 
feature of the picture of the atmosphere as like an ocean of air to predict 
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what would happen when the “weight” of a column of air was varied with 
altitude-a prediction that was beautifully confirmed. Boyle wondered what 
would happen if this hypothesis could be tested at an artificial “altitude” 
(i.e., in a vacuum chamber); his curiosity was rewarded by careful experi- 
mentation. In each case, the model provided the appropriate analogical 
conditions for the test. This is sometimes called the “parallel entailments” 
feature of a good metaphor (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a, pp. 457,460). Cer- 
tain things true of the model will, by implication, also be true of the target 
system. If time is money, then time is a limited resource (because money 
is); if time is money, then time is a valuable resource (because money is) 
(Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a, p. 457).lX 
Alas, there are no time banks, and this brings us to the point at which 
a metaphor may go bad. A good cognitive model is necessarily selective; 
only some aspects of the target system are represented by the analogy. 
The analogy would otherwise be as complex as the target system, provid- 
ing only a replication of the target system, not a model of it (Toulmin, 
1953, p. 165). A useful metaphor suppresses some details and emphasizes 
others, acting as a kind of filter for our understanding of the target system 
(Black, 1962, pp. 41-42; Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a, p. 458; Sanford &Moxey, 
1999, pp. 57-58). To say that the atmosphere is like an ocean of air is not 
to say that all of our knowledge of the actual ocean should be attributed 
to the atmosphere. Similarly, to say that the hydrogen atom is like the 
solar system “clearly does not convey that all of one’s knowledge about the 
solar system should be attributed to the atom. The inheritance of charac- 
teristics is only partial” (Gentner & Gentner, 1983, p. 101). This is where 
the trouble starts. 
Metaphors Gone Bad: Sort-Trespassing and the Internet 
It is quite possible, even likely in certain circumstances, to be ill-served 
by a metaphor. If a metaphor is, fundamentally, the presentation of the 
facts of one category in idioms appropriate to another (Ryle, 1949, p. 8 ) ,  
then to the extent that the idioms of the analogy are not appropriate to 
the target system, we will be confused by the metaphor. We might be just 
a little confused, as when we wonder what color are the tiny particles that 
make up an ideal gas, or whether the objects orbiting the nucleus of the 
hydrogen atom have mountains or are covered with ice. Or we might be 
very confused, as was the tourist in Oxford who, after seeing all of the 
colleges and the Bodleian Library, still asked “But where is the Univer- 
sity?” Gilbert Ryle (1949) famously called this error a “category mistake.” 
Our tourist was mistakenly allocating the university to the same category 
as that to which the other institutions belong (p. 16) . I y  Animistic explana- 
tions of physical events are another example of what Turbayne calls “sort- 
trespassing” (as opposed to legitimate “sort-crossing”) . We transfer our 
experience of how we initiate motion in ourselves to other objects without 
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having any evidence at all that this is a legitimate analogy (actually, even if 
the other objects are people). Small children are especially liable to this 
kind of myth-making (Piaget, 1929, pp. 207ff.). 
Words matter here. The way we talk about a target system in terms of 
a model (especially if we have not made the analogy explicit to ourselves 
or others) can, to a significant extent, bias the way in which we under- 
stand the nature of the target system (Hutten, 1954, pp. 286-87; Russon et 
al., 1994, p. 178). In an important sense, our conceptual scheme replaces 
the reality that it is merely intended to model. If our metaphor is seriously 
out of line with the character of the target system, then we are sort-tres- 
passing in a big way. And we will inevitably follow the associated line of 
parallel entailments down an increasingly muddled conceptual path. It is 
arguable that the typical language used to describe the Internet and the 
World Wide Web is just such a set of sort-trespassing metaphors, and that 
the implied features of this particular target system are not only wrong 
but also represent a serious obstacle to a correct understanding of the 
network and its capabilities. Having the wrong mental model, in this case, 
is a crucial reason for the inability of many of our students to manage 
their interaction with the network in a way that reflects any level of critical 
thinking at all. 
The most basic linguistic, and conceptual, mistake thatwe make about 
the Internetz0 is talking about it as though it were a thing. In fact, we can 
scarcely do otherwise and say anything at all about it. But, just as Oxford 
University, unlike its member colleges and other institutions, is not a thing 
(but we still refer to it that way), so the Internet is, despite our words, not 
a thing. This is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. As soon as we get 
used to talking about the Internet in this way, we are very likely to start 
saying such other things as “the Internet is a place of learning rather than 
uust] a technology” and that the Internet is a place to get information 
(Owen & Owston, 1998, pp. 1 ,9) .  This quite naturally leads to the familiar 
idea that the WWW is a learning highway (again, a place), and “a pretty 
super one at that” (Owen & Owston, 1998, p. 260). A natural extension of 
this line of talk is to describe the Internet as an extremely large database 
and before you know it, we have rashly described the WWW as “nothing 
short of the world’s biggest library” (Maloy, 1999, p. 4). It becomes almost 
irresistible to compare the large Internet search engines to indexes, and to 
refer to them as being like encyclopedias (Owen & Owston, 1998, pp. 73 ,  
81, 87) .*l Having made that jump to the island of conclusions, like the 
hapless travelers in The Phantom Tollbooth, it is difficult to get off again. If 
an index to a document, or collection of documents, even pretends to be 
complete and discriminating (as a good index should), then we might 
further want to claim that, having used several of the largest Internet search 
engines, we will “have left few stones unturned” (Owen & Owston, 1998, 
p. 61).** 
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If the WWW is a huge database indexed by the major search engines 
(that are, moreover, like encyclopedias), then we should expect that an 
associated array of parallel entailments would emerge from the model to 
help us understand the Internet and how it functions in information re- 
trieval. If there are such parallel entailments similar to the ones we have 
noticed in our discussion of other productive models, then this way of 
understanding the WWW will be confirmed. But it is not. 
To begin with, we must not assume that the meaning of “index” in- 
tended here is the most elementary sense-i.e., as an indicator or pointer. 
If it were, then to say that search engines “index” the WWW would be true 
but trivial. The network user will have something much more complex in 
mind (but probably never made explicit), largely from experience with 
indexing and indexes in books, journals, and libraries. Hence, for the 
model to work, there must be some relevant similarity between this con- 
cept and that of “indexing the www” by search engines. What does this 
mean? 
Well, it means at least two things that are most certainly not true of 
either the search engines or the “indexed” pages on the WWW: (1) that 
there has been intelligent intervention in the choice of vocabulary with 
which to describe target document^,'^ and (2) that the documents them- 
selves have been chosen for inclusion in the database according to some 
premeditated design (however general). The user of a book index, an 
encyclopedia, or ajournal database has every right to assume that at least 
these two conditions will obtain information of the document(s) being 
searched. Nothing about any such collection of documents and document 
surrogates, however, will help a student understand how the large search 
engines retrieve pages from the WWW, even under the most carefully 
crafted search statement. Worse yet, we have included in most of our li- 
brary WWW sites, parallel with the uncontrolled Internet, databases that 
do in fact meet the conditions required for proper indexing and vocabu- 
lary control (Cook, 1999,p. 11).24 The difference is almost entirely opaque 
to our readers. It seems fair to conclude that thinking of the Internet as a 
thing, in particular as a thing in important respects like an indexed docu- 
ment collection, is not only a category mistake, but one having clearly 
pernicious intellectual consequence^.^^ 
METAPHORSAND LEARNING:WHY 
SORT-TRESPASSINGMATTERS 
Experience and research have abundantly confirmed that the under- 
standing most users have of the complex systems with which they interact 
is “surprisingly meager, imprecisely specified, and full of inconsistencies, 
gaps, and idiosyncratic quirks” (Norman, 1983, p. 8). Even college-age 
students often map erroneous knowledge onto unfamiliar domains. These 
models may be fragmentary, inaccurate, and even internally inconsistent, 
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yet they strongly affect a person’s construal of new information in the 
domain. We have already seen how this works with analogies that are inap- 
propriate to the target system; it is not surprising that being ill-served by a 
metaphor is common and usually implicit. Models, whether correct or 
incorrect, are carried over in analogical inferencing in other domains 
(Gentner & Gentner, 1983, p. 126). 
The use of metaphor in understanding the unfamiliar, as we have 
seen, is ubiquitous. Borgman (1986) has argued persuasively that users of 
complex interactive systems will, in spite of themselves, try to construct 
some kind of model or analogy to help them understand what is happen- 
ing to them. But they will not take the time and effort to articulate a good 
model of the system, even if they know what that might be; theyjust muddle 
along, never fitting the pieces together (p. 48). I have argued that using a 
mistaken metaphor for a target system will inevitably lead to incorrect 
conclusions about the current and future behavior of the system. What if 
this were not true? What if a bad model of an unfamiliar system is just 
neutral with respect to understanding and interacting with the system, 
however counterintuitive that might seem? It would still be important if 
observation and research indicated that having a good (or better) model 
of an unfamiliar process or event actually improves retention, learning, 
and cognitive success with respect to the system. Indeed, there is every 
indication that this is the case. 
There is abundant evidence that familiar analogies can contribute to 
good instruction (Russon et al., 1994, pp. 178, 184). Mayer (1989) has 
shown conclusively that having a good conceptual model of a system sig- 
nificantly improves the recall of conceptual information, decreases verba- 
tim retention, and increases creative transfer of knowledge to problem 
solving in new situations (pp. 43,49,58-59). Borgman’s own research sug- 
gested to her that a model-based approach to training is superior (although 
only for complex tasks that require some extrapolation beyond basic com- 
mands) (Borgman, 1986, p. 59). Pursuing the same line of experimenta- 
tion, Sparks (1996) concluded that “learners with the most developed 
mental models, profit most from instruction” (p. 24) .26 
This may seem like the truism that, the more you know, the easier it is 
for you to learn. In fact, the idea has a firm theoretical and experimental 
foundation in the work of cognitive psychologist D. P. Ausabel and his 
colleagues on the concept of an “advance organi~er.”~’ As the name im- 
plies, the idea here is that of a toolkit of relevant information, and an 
organizing framework, provided to the student prior to the introduction 
of new or unfamiliar verbal material. Ausabel hypothesized that this ap- 
proach to learning and retention would improve results over the presen- 
tation of unfamiliar verbal material without any advance conceptual warn- 
ing. Subsequent studies confirmed Ausabel’s results (Ausabel, 1960, p. 
267; Ausabel, Novak, & Hanesian, 1978). There seems to be clear 
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evidence that the use of advance organizers, or something functionally 
equivalent, does contribute to the learning and remembering of complex 
text information (Mayer, 1979, p. 381; Anderson, Spiro, &Anderson, 1978, 
p. 439) .28 So,while it may be a truism that the more you know, the easier it 
is for you to learn, it is not trivial.29 
CONCLUSION 
It may be that we have finally come to a largely negative result. It is 
undeniable that many students, and perhaps most WWW searchers, bring 
to their experience conceptual skills and abilities inadequate to the task 
at hand. The analogical understanding many network users have of the 
Internet, based on what they say and how they are observed to search and 
report their results, seems muddled at best and seriously confused at worst. 
At the same time, numerous studies have shown that how one conceptual- 
izes an unfamiliar target system, what model or metaphor represents the 
way one thinks about the system, plays a significant role in learning, re- 
membering, and problem solving within and beyond that system. In the 
philosophy of science, cognitive psychology, and learning theory the con- 
cepts of a mental model and conceptual model have been comprehen- 
sively studied and elaborated; there can be no doubt about the impor- 
tance of these tools in thinking and learning at even modestly complex 
levels. 
It may also be true that, in this context, the Internet is more like wave 
mechanics, string theory, or black holes than anything with which we are 
even remotely familiar. There just may be no readily accessible metaphor 
or model for the network that will function for us as mental models do 
successfully in other areas of thought and experience. It is one thing to 
compare the Internet to a Big Mac, granny’s attic, a soapbox, an informa- 
tion landfill, a yard sale, a gift shop, and junk food-and quite another to 
say something that can be incorporated into a more formal conceptual 
picture for teaching and learning. 
But there may be some hope. Paul Gilster (1997), in Digztal Literacy, 
discusses a variety of ways of thinking creatively about the Internet and 
search engines for the novice as well as the expert user. He finds that the 
analogy between the WWW and a library is a limping analogy at best; for 
this metaphor, the network is still in the dark ages of information retrieval 
(p. 161).Gilster is willing to compare a search engine to a card catalog 
only for restricted purposes; the distinction between field-defined and 
full-text searching illustrates one important difference between a card 
catalog and a search engine, but one that makes any further comparison 
of only limited value. The most suggestive metaphor that Gilster (1997) 
identifies, I think, is the Internet as operatingsystem (pp. 239-41). Ifwe can 
develop an analogy, even if only a thin one, that exploits computing con- 
cepts already familiar to most of our students, then at least some of the 
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characteristics of a good mental model may be available to us to teach 
more effectively about the Internet. How might this work? 
Instead of thinking of the Internet as a place, offers Gilster (1997), 
maybe it should be thought of as a kind of virtual hard disk or virtual 
machine (p. 240). What the network (plus a browser) amounts to, meta- 
phorically, is an environment (like an office environment). An operating 
system is not an applications program itself, or a data file or collection of 
data files, although it links all of these at a particular time for a particular 
user and a particular machine. The familiar concepts of multitasking, 
multiprocessing, multithreading, and time sharing all apply, in analogical 
ways, to the network as we experience it. But perhaps the most important 
characteristic of an operating system, in this context, is that it is itself a 
pretense. 
An important part of the general purpose of a computer operating 
system is to deceive the user into believing that the actual machine is 
different in important respects from what it really is. The management of 
resources is a central function of an operating system (Calingaert, 1982, 
p. 3); one way the program does this is by creating and presenting a vir-
tual machine (and virtual resources) to the user. This has the highly desir- 
able effect of making the programming language of the virtual machine 
more attractive than that of the original machine (Hansen, 1973, p. 3) .  
The operating system achieves this result, in part, by creating virtual de- 
vices and peripherals having a merely logical relationship to the actual 
system hardware. The user can then concentrate on working with data 
files and the names of data records, for example, instead ofworrylng about 
where any of these things are actually being managed or stored. Virtual 
memory, imaginary memory spaces, and virtual resources in general are 
mixed equally with actual memory spaces and programming resources in 
a way that is completely transparent to the user. All of this happens so 
quickly that the concurrent processing and multitasking necessary to main- 
tain the pretense is also hidden from the user. 
Many of the concepts that we associate with familiar operating sys- 
tems (e.g., DOS, Windows, OS2) can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the 
network browser environment. The most important of these, perhaps, is 
that the operating system is itself devoid of content. It provides a comput- 
ing and user environment, but it is neutral with respect to what informa- 
tion and programs are selected by the user to function in that environ- 
ment. An operating system can manage, more or less, false data, incom- 
plete data, faulty programs, and just plain bad information as easily as it 
can coordinate good data, well-organized files, effective programs, and 
quality information. This is a crucial feature of the metaphor: an operat- 
ing system may create, for special purposes, a virtual disk, but it makes no 
claim about the content of the disk; the data on the virtual disk may be 
flawed, or the intellectual organization may be inadequate to the purpose, 
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but it is not the job of the operating system to sort out these particular 
problems. Neither is it the job of the network. So, while some features of 
an operating system can be mapped onto the Internet, others cannot- 
just as we have come to expect of productive metaphors. This is, I think, a 
promising start to developing a conceptual model for the Internet that 
can be used in instruction. 
APPENDIX 
The Billiard Ball Model of an Ideal Gas 
Boyle also noticed something else during his experiments with the 
air pump. Air, he said, is distinctly felt to be “springy” in the operation of 
a compressor or a pump. In either device, the physical sensation one gets 
is as of pushing or pulling a spring. No  such effect is observed in the 
pumping of water. In fact, if this were not the case, certain kinds of air 
pumps would not work at all (Conant, 1951, p. 95). Boyle was lavish in his 
use of metaphor to describe the cause of the springiness of air, the most 
obvious analogy being a watch spring. He also likened the particles that 
he assumed made up the atmosphere to a heap of wool bundles that are 
constantly trying to push out against any attempt to compress them, or to 
coiled wires of varying lengths unwound from a cylinder and therefore 
having “springiness” in them (Hall, 1965, pp. 381-382; Conant, 1957, p. 
57). 
Another way to look at this phenomenon, according to Boyle, is after 
the manner of Descartes: various kinds of particles are all swirled about in 
the subtle fluid that fills all of space. Boyle claimed that he was neutral on 
this issue, although he certainly was an adherent of the corpuscular phi- 
losophy (Brush, 1983, pp. 15-16). He apparently was willing, at least in 
print, to distinguish between the picture of air as an elastic fluid and any 
particular model by which this characteristic of the atmosphere might be 
explained( Conant, 1947, p. 47). His discussion, however, clearly antici- 
pates the kinetic theory of gases later developed in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. 
The typical model of an ideal gas is, at first glance, not so very far 
from Boyle’s springs (and pulleys and levers). As physicist Norman 
Campbell (1921) remarked, just the most familiar things in the world to 
us are objects in motion; it is through motion that anything and every- 
thing happens (p. 84).30 We know, in general, what happens when moving 
bodies collide with one another, or with a fixed object or surface, although 
we may not know exactly the physical laws describing these reactions. We 
also know that how a moving object behaves under these circumstances is 
partly a function of what kindof object it is: soft or hard, smooth or rough, 
round or otherwise. Certain kinds of objects seem to absorb more impact 
than others: a soft object crushes under impact, while a hard object tends 
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more to bounce under impact. Some objects seem to give up all of their 
motion when they strike a surface or another object (think of the familiar 
child’s toy that is four ball bearings suspended in tandem from parallel, 
horizontal bars). 
When we apply these images to a theory of gases, we quickly find 
ourselves talking about objects like billiard balls, grains of sand, or marbles. 
And what we already know is quite a lot about the laws of motion of mac- 
roscopic elastic spheres of this kind. When physicists speak of a model for 
a theory, generally what they have in mind is a system of things differing 
chiefly in size from things that are at least approximately realizable in 
familiar experience (Nagel, 1961, p. 110). This is precisely what the bil- 
liard ball model of an ideal gas achieve^.^' The model gives us an interpre- 
tation of the postulates for the kinetic theory of gases in terms of theoreti- 
cal expressions like “change in the total momentum of the molecules strik- 
ing a unit surface” (Nagel, 1961, p. 113).We already know from the gen- 
eral laws of dynamics what will be the effect on the motions of the par- 
ticles of their collisions with each other and with the walls of a container. 
We can show, therefore, that: 
particles such as are imagined by the theory, moving with the speed 
attributed to them, would exert the pressure that the gas actually 
exerts, and that this pressure would vary with the volume of the ves- 
sel and with the temperature in the manner described in Boyle’s and 
Gay-Lussac’s Laws. (Campbell, 1921, p. 82)” 
This way of looking at the properties of a gas and, indeed, of any 
fluid, eventually gave rise to other questions: How many particles make up 
a gas of a given volume? How fast do the particles move as a function of 
temperature? How much mass does each particle exhibit? What exactly is 
heat? These and similar questions were all approached with an increas- 
ingly sophisticated array of mathematical and quantitative experimental 
techniques in the development of thermodynamics and the chemistry of 
fluids during the nineteenth century.33 
NOTES 
There seems no doubt that there is a clear gap between student use of Internet re- 
sources and the quality of the resources that instructors expect their students to be 
using (Grimes & Boening, 2001). 
It would be ironic if it turns out that some part, perhaps a significant part, of this cogni- 
tive deficit is the result of the early (and uncritical) introduction of computers to chil- 
dren at home and in the schooIs. See the interesting work ofJane Healy, as reported in 
Healy (1990) and Healy (1998).’ For an instructive comparison of printed books with the WWW in this context, see 
McKenzie (2000).Jamie McKenzie has written a great many sensible things about in- 
structional and information technology; anyone interested in the application of tech- 
nology to the school curriculum should visit his Internet site: http://www.fno.org/. 
Birkerts’s book is a perceptive phenomenology of reading. 
We also talk about, for example, an argument as being “solid,” a metaphor we bring 
over from our experience of physical objects and the world of tactile perception: what is 
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solid is more “real” than what cannot he touched or felt. We ordinarly judge a visual 
experience to he illusory if we cannot also experience the object in tactile space. 
Nowhere is our language more metaphorical than in the ways we speak and write about 
computers. Consider just this small sample: 
backbone 

hoot 

clipboard 

number crunching 

motherboard (fatherboard?) 

daughterboard 

desktop 

search engine 

nesting 

surfing 

virus 

It is instructive, therefore, that perhaps the most frequent model offered for neural and 
mental activity these days is a romputer. It would not be surprising ifwe eventually found 
“human” characteristics in the behavior of computing machinery; we projected upon 
computers a highly anthropomorphic vocabulary from the outset. Kenneth Craik started 
this talk in 1943 with the publication of his brilliant hut uneven The Nature of Explana-
tion. This important book defended the idea that the brain can he regarded as a kind of 
calculating machine, and that neurological activity in the brain models the external 
world as patterns of electrical and chemical activity. ‘ We are not ordinarily inclined to talk about arguments in terms of armored support, 
supply lines, or air cover. Time may he money, hut there are no time hanks into which 
one may make a deposit or from which time may he withdrawn; you can’t even get a 
refund on wasted time (Lakoff &Johnson, 1980a, p. 460). ’ The contributions to Gentner and Stevens (1983) cover this ground thoroughly for 
cognitive psychology. For applications in science, see especially HarrC (1959), Hesse 
(1954, 1966, 1967), Hutten (1956), Kargon (1969), Mellor (1968), Miller (1986), and 
Nagel (1961). For useful discussions of the role of metaphor in philosophy and lan- 
guage, see Beardsley (1967), Berggren (1962, 1963), Black (1962), Lakoff and Johnson 
(1980), Pepper (1973), and Turbayne (1970).’ The loci rlasszci are Campbell (1920, 1921), and Duhem (1954). 
lo  These two examples are very common in treatments of science for the popular market; 
see, for instance, Conant (1947, 1951) and Derry (1999). For a discussion of the use of 
analogy in biology, see Canguilhem (1963). The second example is discussed in the 
appendix. 
” While nature may abhor a vacuum, small children apparently do not. If the wind is not 
blowing in a closed room, then the room is “empty” (Piaget, 1930, pp. 3-31). 
The history of the development of the air pump as a scientific instrument is briefly 
sketched in Wolf (1950,pp. 99-109).i t  is more than appropriate to notice the important 
contribution to this effort made by Boyle’s contemporary, Robert Hooke (Jardine, 1999). 
Other implications of the Torricelian hypothesis were also confirmed by experiment. 
Two very smooth pieces of marble when pushed together, for instance, will “adhere” 
until placed into an operating vacuum receiver; at a certain point, the stones simply fall 
apart. An excellent discussion of these experiments in the context of the times is Brett 
(1944). For a historical and sociological analysis of the controversy between Thomas 
Hobbes and Boyle on these matters, see Shapin and Schaffer (1985); a more traditional 
account is Kargon (1966). 
l4 For instance, the model of electricity as a flowing liquid provides one useful way of 
understanding the movement of an electric current through a conductor, while the 
model of electricity as a teeming crowd provides another model for the same phenom- 
enon (Centner & Gentner, 1983). 
l5 See also Rickheit and Sichelschmidt (1999,pp. 19-20). The idea is that a good cognitive 
model should permit its user to “run” the model for additional implications and under- 
standing (itself a metaphor), 
l6 This is a psychologized version of the Aristotelian requirement that the explanatory 
premises he “better known” to us than the thing to he explained (PosteriorAnalytics, 1.2) 
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” 	The gulf between common sense and the scientific outlook was a persistent theme in 
Bertrand Russell’s popular books on scientific ideas; see especially Russell (1923, 1925). 
Lakoff applies the concept of metaphorical understanding of the unfamiliar to the realm 
of mathematics in his analysis of how we acquire mathematical concepts (Lakoff & Nuiiez, 
2000). Parallel entailments are no less important in this context (Lakoff & Nuiiez, 2000, 
pp. 56, 64, 68,92, 97, 367). See also Piaget (1952) and Piaget and Inhelder (1964). 
l9 	 Or, as the famous Blue Guide to Oxford and Cambridge charmingly observes: “There is 
no University Building as such, the ‘University’ being the inward and spiritual grace of 
which the colleges are the outward and visible forms.” 
I will use the terms “Internet” and “World Wide Web” interchangeably. 
B ’  	 I don’t mean to pick on Owen and Owston here. Their book is generally a sound guide 
to searching the WWW, especially for secondary-school students; the authors know bet- 
ter than many of the misleading statements I have singled out here. But, as I have em- 
phasized, words matter; once we start sort-trespassing, it is hard to qualify our language 
to reflect the caution we know is appropriate. 
22 Of course, I can’t leave out the most ubiquitous Internet metaphor of all: “surfing” the 
‘net. But if the metaphor surffrom the sports world involves “chaotic movement in a 
fluid environment with no starting point of destination” (Barker, 1998, p. 262), then 
the idea of surfing the learning highway in a purposeful way is an instructively mixed 
metaphor that should be a cautionary tale. We actually know a student who replied, 
when asked in what database she had found a particular citation: “AltaVista.” Nautical 
metaphors seem to be the trend in describing the WWW. It is becoming fashionable, for 
example, to talk about the “surface” Web and the “deep” Web. If surfing the WWW is 
equivalent to getting no further down than the surface W W ,  then it is even less true 
that the largest search engines leave “few stones unturned.” 
23 Indexing languages based on the language of the indexed text are often contrasted with 
controlledindexing languages (based, for example, on a thesaurus). But, as Hans Wellisch 
(1995) has argued, “all indexinglanguages, being used for the purpose of rearranging 
the conceptual structure of natural-language texts in condensed and predictable form 
are, by definition, controlled” (p. 215). 
24 	 This is why the client-server model of the Internet is also flawed: it makes the Internet 
appear to be one huge database (Devlin, 1997, p. 365). 
25 	 The language we use to describe the Internet can have, it turns out, significant legal 
implications. In the landmark case about Internet filtering in public libraries, Main-
stream Loudoun v. Board of Trustees ofthe Loudoun CounQ Library (2 F. Supp. 2d 783), part 
of the Court’s decision rested upon the conclusion that the Internet is more like an 
encyclopedia than it is like a vast interlibrary loan system. The Court ruled that the 
defendants misconstrued the nature of the Internet, and found in this regard in favor 
of the plaintiffs’ encyclopedia analogy. The fact that neither metaphor is appropriate 
would make an interesting law review article. 
Sh 	Sparks did find, however, that presenting analogies and illustrations together in a learn- 
ing problem failed to improve model quality as expected; in fact, the reverse was true. 
He concluded that cognitive overload was the explanatory factor, but the fact that the 
analogy and the illustration were unrelated to each other may also have contributed to 
his results (Sparks, 1996, p. 107). 
27 	 This kind of filter has an analog in perceptual experience. What we take ourselves to 
“see,” for example, clearly depends on advanced filtering by the brain/mind as a func- 
tion of prior or simultaneous categorization and inferencing (Bruner, 1957). The work 
OfJerome Bruner, his colleagues, and his students in the 1950s and 1960s on the role of 
mental models in perceiving and learning provides a broad and comprehensive theo- 
retical foundation for many of the conclusions reached here. Bruner extended his re- 
sults to education after the famous Woods Hole Conference on Education in 1959 in a 
series of important studies of classroom learning and teaching (Bruner, 1960, 1966, 
1971). Many of Bruner’s most suggestive papers are included in Bruner, 1973; the de- 
velopment of his thinking about these and other matters is engagingly told in his infor- 
mal autobiography (Bruner, 1983). 
28 Anderson, Spiro, and Anderson (1978) concluded, however, that although Ausabel was 
on the right track, the “theoretical justification for the advance organizer is quite flimsy” 
(p. 439). 
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’’ 	This was, despite widespread misunderstanding, largely the point of E. D. Hirsch’s (1987) 
hook about reading and learning. 
30 	 Campbell (1920) discusses his own example of the dynamic theory of gases in much 
greater technical detail (pp. 126-30). Even Newton described his thinking about light 
in terms of how he noticed the way in which a tennis hall behaves after it has been struck 
by an oblique racket (Lightman, 1989, p. 97). 
31 	 And this is why the scientist-turned-philosopher Sir James Jeans (1940) expounded on 
the billiard-ball model in such elaborate detail in his monograph on the kinetic theory 
of gases(pp. 12-16). 
32 	 The model breaks down when the density is too high or the temperature too low, be- 
cause other ways in which the gas molecules interact (e.g., they attract each other) then 
become more important. So the model requires modification for these situations (Derry, 
1999, p. 74). This is why the most eminent British physicist of the nineteenth century, 
Lord Kelvin (1903), remarked that at  this level we can speak only of rough approxima- 
tions to absolute values, not “delicate differential results” (pt  11, p. 500).
”’	This history is briefly told in Toulmin and Goodfield (1962) and Einstein and Infeld 
(1938). For a brief chronological survey of the concept of the atom and a literature 
review, see L. L. U’hyte (1961). The correct interpretation of one observational confir- 
mation of the molecular theory of fluids (Brownian motion) was the subject of one of 
Einstein’s famous 1905 papers in theoretical physics. 
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